The Real Reason a Far-Right Cabinet Minister Has Netanyahu's Ear

The Real Reason a Far-Right Cabinet Minister Has Netanyahu's Ear

Benjamin Netanyahu does not listen to far-right cabinet ministers out of ideological conversion; he listens because his political survival, legal immunity, and coalition arithmetic depend entirely on their refusal to walk away. For years, commentators have treated the influence of National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich as a sudden, inexplicable capture of Israel’s most seasoned political operator. That reading misses the mechanics of Jerusalem power. The tail is wagging the dog because the dog has nowhere else to go.

Watch how the coalition actually operates inside the Knesset. In a 120-seat parliament where 61 votes buy another day in office, Netanyahu’s 37th government was built on a razor-thin 64-seat foundation after the 2022 elections, one that shrank further as ultra-Orthodox factions clashed over military conscription and individual lawmakers bolted. When your margin is zero to three seats, every minor party leader holds a loaded weapon aimed at the prime minister’s chair. Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit and Smotrich’s Religious Zionism do not merely offer advice during cabinet meetings. They hold the keys to early elections, and an early election for Netanyahu means losing the institutional shield of the premiership while his ongoing corruption trial grinds forward in the Jerusalem District Court.

The Arithmetic of Survival

Most foreign observers look at Netanyahu’s rhetoric and assume he is being dragged rightward against his instincts. Spend enough time tracking Israeli coalition history, and a colder calculation emerges. Netanyahu has always been a transactional realist who prices loyalty in seats, not sentiment.

Before 2022, mainstream right-wing politicians refused to sit with Netanyahu because of his indictments for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. Figures like Benny Gantz, Yair Lapid, and Avigdor Lieberman had burned their bridges with Likud’s leader, leaving him isolated on the center-right. To assemble a majority, Netanyahu engineered the merger of fringe Kahanist factions with mainstream religious nationalists, legitimizing men who had once been pariahs in the Knesset. Once they crossed the electoral threshold together, the trap snapped shut.

Consider the numbers that dictated Israeli governance through the Gaza war and into the deadlocked October 2026 election cycle:

  • The Veto Power of Six to Seven Seats: Neither Ben-Gvir nor Smotrich ever commanded a mass party on the scale of Likud. Yet in a coalition hovering near 60 or 61 mandates, pulling seven seats instantly collapses the government.
  • The Legal Shield: Remaining prime minister allows Netanyahu to appoint loyalists to justice and policing portfolios, delay state commissions of inquiry into the October 7 intelligence and military failures, and maintain executive authority while fighting criminal charges.
  • The Post-Election Stalemate: Even after the October 2026 ballot left Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious bloc at 53 seats against former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot’s 48-seat opposition bloc—with Arab-led parties holding 19 seats—Netanyahu immediately assured Ben-Gvir and Smotrich that they were staying together, knowing he could not construct a right-wing alternative without their combined 13 mandates.

Every time a ceasefire proposal surfaced in 2024 or 2025, or whenever Washington pressed for a post-war governance framework in Gaza involving the Palestinian Authority, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich issued explicit ultimatums. If Netanyahu signed off, they would dissolve the government. Netanyahu listened because the alternative was immediate political extinction.

Institutional Capture Over Headline Politics

Loud television appearances draw international outrage, yet the real reason a far-right cabinet minister has Netanyahu's ear lies in quiet bureaucratic restructuring. While cameras followed Ben-Gvir’s provocative visits to the Temple Mount or his demands for harsher prison conditions for Palestinian detainees, both he and Smotrich systematically rewired the Israeli state from the inside out.

Netanyahu did not just hand them cabinet titles; he signed coalition agreements that carved up traditional ministries and stripped career civil servants of authority. That structural surrender gave them direct control over money, policing, and territory.

The Ministry of National Security

When Ben-Gvir demanded the renaming and expansion of the Public Security Ministry in late 2022, veteran police commissioners warned of politicization. They were right. Through legislative amendments pushed through the Knesset, Ben-Gvir gained unprecedented authority to set police policy and influence senior promotions.

Officers who prioritized cracking down on nationalist crime or protecting anti-government protesters found their career paths blocked. Meanwhile, rapid-fire gun licensing reforms flooded civilian streets with tens of thousands of new firearm permits, accompanied by the creation of armed civilian emergency squads in mixed cities and West Bank settlements. Netanyahu signed off on every step because keeping Ben-Gvir busy building a loyalist security apparatus kept him inside the coalition tent.

The Civil Administration Takeover

Smotrich’s quiet revolution inside the Defense Ministry proved even more consequential. As a minister embedded within the Defense Ministry alongside his role at Finance, Smotrich assumed sweeping civilian powers over Area C of the West Bank—roughly 60 percent of the territory.

Traditionally, military commanders balanced settler demands against international law and diplomatic fallout with Washington. Smotrich transferred those decision-making powers to civilian ideologues aligned with the settlement movement. Outpost legalizations accelerated, tens of thousands of housing units advanced through planning committees, and infrastructure budgets poured into deep West Bank communities. By the time Smotrich stood beside a map of the E1 settlement corridor in 2025 boasting that it would bury the idea of a Palestinian state, the bureaucratic facts on the ground were already locked into place. Netanyahu let him build those facts because Smotrich’s religious nationalist base acted as Netanyahu’s most reliable firewall against domestic protests.

Why Netanyahu Rarely Pushes Back

Critics often ask why a prime minister with decades of diplomatic experience—a man who prides himself on managing American presidents and navigating regional crises—would allow junior partners to torch Israel’s standing with key allies. The answer requires looking at how Likud itself has changed.

Likud is no longer the ideological home of Ze'ev Jabotinsky or Menachem Begin, where respect for the courts and institutional restraint tempered nationalist ambition. Over fifteen years of personalist rule, Netanyahu purged independent thinkers from Likud’s upper ranks. What remained was a party apparatus competing for the exact same rightward-drifting electorate as Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism.

Walk into a Likud central committee meeting or listen to party primaries, and the boundary between Likud backbenchers and Ben-Gvir’s disciples blurs. Likud lawmakers openly attack the Attorney General, call for defying Supreme Court rulings, and echo the rhetoric of settler activists. If Netanyahu were to publicly humiliate Ben-Gvir or fire Smotrich over policy disagreements, he would not be cheered by his own party. He would trigger a revolt from his own rank-and-file voters, who view the far-right ministers as the only politicians bold enough to say out loud what Likud whispers.

The Leverage of Blame

There is also a cynical utility to keeping extremists in the room. For a master tactician like Netanyahu, having hardline ministers at the cabinet table provides permanent diplomatic cover.

When facing pressure from Washington over humanitarian aid corridors into Gaza, hostage negotiation concessions, or settlement freezes, Netanyahu can point to his right flank and plead powerlessness. I would like to accommodate you, the unspoken message goes, but my coalition partners will bring down the government tomorrow morning, and then you will have chaos.

This good-cop, bad-cop routine worked across multiple American administrations. It allowed Netanyahu to stall for time, extract military aid, and avoid concrete commitments on Palestinian statehood while blaming the rigidity of Jerusalem’s domestic politics. Far from being an accidental burden, Ben-Gvir’s extremism became Netanyahu’s favorite bargaining chip on the international stage.

The Counter-Argument That Missed the Mark

For months, centrist opposition leaders and foreign diplomats clung to a comforting theory: Netanyahu was secretly looking for an exit ramp. According to this line of thinking, the prime minister would eventually dump his far-right allies, pivot toward a national unity government with figures like Gadi Eisenkot or Benny Gantz, and restore Israel’s traditional alliances.

Events repeatedly exposed that theory as wishful thinking. During the war in Gaza, Gantz joined an emergency war cabinet, giving Netanyahu a golden opportunity to sideline Ben-Gvir and Smotrich permanently. Instead, Netanyahu kept the far-right ministers inside the broader security cabinet, leaked against his own generals, and allowed Gantz to walk out in June 2024 rather than risk a rupture with his ideological base.

Even in November 2026, amid post-election coalition deadlocks and reports that Netanyahu’s associates quietly floated the idea of a unity government excluding Ben-Gvir’s party to satisfy Washington, Otzma Yehudit lawmakers dismissed the trial balloons with practiced contempt. They knew Netanyahu’s pattern. Every time he flirts with the center, he retreats back to the hard right the moment the price tag—an independent state inquiry into October 7, or stepping aside as prime minister—becomes real. Centrist politicians demand accountability; far-right ministers only demand territory, budgets, and ideological concessions. For Netanyahu, that is an easy trade.

What Happens When the Leverage Reverses

A relationship built on mutual hostage-taking eventually alters the hostage-taker. Netanyahu believed he was renting the far right’s votes to protect his career. Instead, he handed them the legitimacy and state machinery needed to outlast him.

Younger voters in Israel, particularly within the national-religious and traditional Mizrahi demographics, have shifted steadily rightward over the past decade, hardened by years of rocket fire, the trauma of October 7, and disillusionment with diplomatic peace processes. Ben-Gvir and Smotrich speak their language without apology. While Netanyahu relies on nostalgia for his past economic and security achievements, his far-right ministers offer an uncompromising vision of permanent territorial control and assertive Jewish supremacy.

When Netanyahu eventually leaves the stage—whether through coalition collapse, a courtroom verdict, or the ballot box—the institutional changes he approved will remain embedded in Israel’s police force, judiciary, and West Bank administration. He gave a far-right cabinet minister his ear to survive the week, and in doing so, handed him the next decade of Israeli politics.

DK

Dylan King

Driven by a commitment to quality journalism, Dylan King delivers well-researched, balanced reporting on today's most pressing topics.